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Wednesday, January 25, 2012

The Rouge trader and Societe Generale



Societe Generale was founded in 1864 by a group of industrialists, bankers, businessmen, and heads of railway companies, after an authorization decree was signed by Napoleon III. By 1870, it had around 47 branches in Paris and other provinces in France. In 1871, the bank‘s permanent office was set up in London and the bank went public. Between 1871 and 1893, several banking establishments in France failed after which Societe Generale‘s pace of growth slowed down. As of 1889, it had 149 branches. In 1894, Societe Generale began providing short-term credit to traders and industrialists and also issuing private debenture loans. The bank‘s activities expanded to Russia at that time.

By 1920, Societe Generale had emerged as a leading bank in France. In 1928, a subsidiary CALIF that specialized in medium-term credit was created. The 1930s and the early 1940s were a difficult period for the bank. The operations in France and Europe were adversely affected by World War II, due to which Societe Generale started scouting for opportunities in other countries and moved to the US and Africa.

In 1945, Societe Generale was nationalized. Between 1945 and 1958, France was experiencing economic recovery. It was also a period of radical changes in the banking industry and the industrial demand for credit was high. At that time, Societe Generale expanded into Italy and Mexico. During the 1960s, Societe Generale expanded rapidly in France and also internationally. With the changes in the banking sector like the decreasing difference between traditional and investment banking, advent of the home mortgage market, leasing, etc, Societe Generale launched services like leasing and opened new subsidiaries especially for credit.


In 1987, Societe Generale was privatized, after which it began growing rapidly, both organically and through acquisitions. In 1997, it acquired Crédit du Nord, which strengthened its position in the retail banking segment. During the 1990s and 2000s, the bank made several acquisitions in Romania, Madagascar, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Bulgaria. It also took a controlling stake in the TCW group, an investment management company. Besides, Societe Generale continued to make acquisitions in Africa in the 2000s — in Morocco, Ghana, and Tunisia. Societe Generale‘s asset management and private banking activities also continued to develop, with the launch of Societe Generale Asset Management UK, in London and the acquisition of Japan-based Yamaichi Securities Company Limited, a securities trading firm. As of 2007, Societe Generale was present in 82 countries across the world. By the end of 2007, its activities were organized into French Networks, International Retail Banking, Financial Services, Global Investment Management and Services, Corporate and Investment Banking.

The French Networks included Societe Generale and the retail networks of Credit du Nord and served more than nine million customers. They operated 2,997 branches across France. The International Retail Banking division was created in 1998. As of December 2008, International Retail Banking had a presence in 37 countries across the world. Its financial services included business finance and services, consumer credit, and insurance. Global Investment Management and Services consisted of asset management, private banking, securities services, custody and clearing on organized markets, and online banking. Corporate and Investment Banking services of Societe Generale were offered in 46 countries across the world and consisted of equities, fixed income, currencies and commodities, and financing & advisory activities.

The activities at Delta One included arbitrage trading. Arbitrage or proprietary trading involved purchasing a portfolio of financial instruments and at the same time, selling another portfolio of similar financial instruments, with slightly different value, thus taking advantage of the difference in valuation of correlated assets. Arbitrage traders were required to ‗go long‘ for one set of portfolios, i.e. bet that the value would go up in a specified period. At the same time, they were required to ‗go short‘ for the other set of portfolios i.e. bet that their value would go down in the same period. They gained through minute price differential between these two sets of portfolios. When a minor price difference arose between the portfolios, the arbitrage traders capitalized on it.
As the difference between the values of both the portfolios was very small, trading in these portfolios involved operations with high nominal amounts. This was low risk investment, as both the portfolios had similar characteristics and offset each other. Traders involved in arbitrage were not allowed to take open positions (positions that speculated the rise and fall of markets).

Kerviel (born January 11, 1977) joined Societe Generale in August 2000 after graduating in finance from Lumière University Lyon 2, France. Initially, he worked in the back and middle offices, where his job involved processing and overseeing transactions made by the traders. In 2004, he was promoted as a trader assistant, and worked on risk analysis and hedging. In 2005, Kerviel was transferred to the Delta One trading desk where he held the post of equity index arbitrage trader (Refer to Exhibit III for reporting structure of Kerviel at Delta One). At Delta One, Kerviel was an arbitrage trader specializing in the European stock markets. His main responsibilities included handling proprietary deals in the futures market. He was required to purchase a portfolio of stock index futures and at the same time sell a similar mix of futures, with slightly different value. Explaining Kerviel‘s responsibilities, Jean-Pierre Mustier (Mustier), Head, Investment Banking at Societe Generale, said, ―His job was to make bets on small price differences between contracts, not to trade on the markets‘ direction. Kerviel was required to trade in Turbo Warrants and was asked to maintain a hedged position at all times. The net value of his portfolio was to be maintained at € 500,000 and the net position was not to exceed the risk limit that was pegged at € 125 million. In financial circles, arbitrage trading was considered to be less glamorous than one way transactions and less risky too.

According to Robert Youngman, Portfolio Manager with Griffin Asset Management Inc., an investment management firm, ―It‘s low risk kind of investing, unless you get it wrong. You see a minor spread between the portfolios show up every once in a while and capitalize on it. The origin of the fraud dates back to June 2005, when Kerviel began taking directional bets in small amounts and covering these with fictitious transactions in the opposite direction on the European stock market indices like Euro Stoxx 507, German DAX8 and FTSE 1009. The financial instruments in the original portfolio were subjected to the risk limit and margin calls with clearing houses10. As long as the financial instruments in the portfolio were purchased and Societe Generale considered them purchased, the margin calls were checked and settled.

An incident that occurred in 2005 made Kerviel sure about his ability to earn profits from his directional bets. According to Kerviel, ―The best trading day in the history of Societe Generale was September 11, 200111. At least, that‘s what one of my managers told me. It seems that profits were colossal that day. I had a similar experience during the London attacks in July 2005. In July 2005, Kerviel made a shorting bet on the stock of Allianz13. In Kerviel‘s own words, ―I then took a position on Allianz, betting the markets would fall. It just so happened that a little while later, the market fell after the London bombings and it‘s the jackpot, € 500,000. To make it appear as if the stock had been hedged, he created a fake long transaction. He said, ―I had mixed feelings because I was proud of the result, but surprised at the same time. That produced a desire to continue. There was a snowball effect. With the initial successes, Kerviel continued to take directional calls on the market, without hedging. As his confidence grew, he began building up unhedged positions. In 2005 and 2006, Kerviel took positions primarily on equities. Between June 2005 and February 2006, the fraudulent transactions were valued at € 15 million. These increased to € 135 million after February 2006 till the end of the year. He took directional bets above € 5 million each on the equities of Allianz, Solarworld, and Q-Cells.

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